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Case No. 910165 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, 
vs. 
KELLEY ROWE, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
—oooOooo— 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Category No. 14 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to 
the Utah Court of Appeals. This Court has jurisdiction to 
hear the case under Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3) (a) (Supp. 
1991). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Did the majority of the court of appeals 
erroneously conclude that a violation of the nighttime search 
warrant authorization provision, Utah Code Ann. §77-23-5 
(1990), constitute a constitutional violation of such that, 
the "exclusionary rule" is applicable? Did the majority of 
the court of appeals erroneously conclude that the officers 
1 
acted in "bad faith" in executing the search warrant. 
2. Did the majority of the court of appeals 
erroneously conclude that the status of being an "invited 
guest" in a third-party's home "vests" the guest with a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence such that 
the guest may challenge the validity of a search warrant for 
the home? Does, inversely, a guest lose his/her 
constitutional protections and freedoms from unreasonable 
searches at a front door? 
3. Did the majority of the court of appeals 
erroneously conclude that the state mi ist pr- :)ve a defendantf s 
abandonment of an expectation of privacy by "clear, 
unequivocal and decisive evidence"? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRQYISI QMSu ^ lAIIIlfiS^ND. RULES 
Relevant constitutional provisions, statutes and rules 
for a determination of this case are, i n pertinent part: 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-5 (1990) . Issuance of 
warrant — Time and place arrests may be 
made. 
A magistrate may issue a warrant for arrest 
upon finding probable cause to believe that the 
person to be arrested has committed a public 
offense. If the offense charge is: (1) a felony, 
the arrest upon a warrant may be made at any time 
of the day or night. 
Utah Code Annotated §77-23-5 (1990). Time 
for service -- Officer may request 
2 
assistance. 
(1) The magistrate must insert a direction in 
the [search] warrant that it be served in the 
daytime, unless the affidavits or oral testimony 
state a reasonable cause to believe a search is 
necessary in the night to seize the property prior 
to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged or 
altered, or for other good reason; in which case he 
may insert a direction that it be served any time 
of the day or night. An officer may request other 
persons to assist him in conducting the search. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-23-10 (1990). Force used 
in executing warrant — Notice of authority 
prerequisite, when. 
When a search warrant has been issued 
authorizing entry into any building, room, 
conveyance, compartment or other enclosure, the 
officer executing the warrant may use such force as 
is reasonably necessary to enter: 
(1) If, after notice of his authority 
and purpose, there is no response or he is not 
admitted with reasonable promptness; or 
(2) Without notice of his authority and 
purpose, if the magistrate issuing the warrant 
directs in the warrant that the officer need not 
give notice. The magistrate shall so direct only 
upon proof, under oath, that the object of the 
search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or 
secreted, or that physical harm may result to any 
person if notice were given. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Keeley Laursen Rowe, was charged with 
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-
8(2) (a) (i) and (b) (ii) (Supp. 1989) (R. 10). Prior to trial, 
defendant-respondent moved to suppress the evidence seized 
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pursuant to a search warrant executed on a third-party!s home 
in which she was present (R. 28-31). The matter was 
considered without hearing, denying defendant-respondent the 
opportunity to more clearly evidence her standing and to 
respond to the state's position. The matter was ruled upon 
based on the written memoranda submitted ly fife parties, and 
denied (R. 32-41, 51-55, 60-61). 
Subsequently, defendant-respondent waived her right to a 
jury; a bench trial was held on March 21, 1989, in the Fifth 
Judicial District Court, Washington County, Utah (R. 50, 62-
65; T. 5 ) . During trial, defendant-respondent reasserted her 
motion to suppress the evidence (T. ; 8, 104-05) , The motion 
was again denied T. 108). Defendant-respondent was 
convicted as crargea \ n . oo; i. 181), Defendant-respondent 
was sentenced "he statutory indeterminate term of zero to 
five years; but, imprisonment was stayed and defendant-
respondent was placed on probation (R. 80-84). Defendant-
respondent was not granted the opportunity to be heard and 
either present a reply or evidence in opposition to the 
state f s asser t i l ons 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals, in a split 
decisioi . eversed defendant's conviction and remanded the 
* -.-: AI t i: :ii a 1 , coi icl u ling that (1! ) the sea rcl l wa rrar it 
improperly authorized a nighttime search, (2) the remedy for 
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a defective nighttime search authorization was suppression, 
(3) the "good-faith" exception of Leon did not apply (4) 
defendant-respondent, as an "invited guest" in a third-
party's home, had an expectation of privacy in the home 
sufficient to allow her to challenge the search warrant, and 
(5) defendant-respondent had not abandoned an expectation of 
privacy in her purse left in the home. State v. Rowef 806 
P.2d 730 (Utah App.), cert, granted,, 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 
(Utah July 3, 1991). 
On April 9, 1991, the state timely filed a petition for 
writ of certiorari in this Court. On July 3, 1991, the 
petition was granted. 
STATEMENT QF THE FACTS 
On October 7, 1988, a search warrant was issued and 
executed which authorized police to search for narcotics in 
the residence of Stan Swickey in Leeds, Utah. The warrant 
contained provisions which allowed police to enter "day or 
night," and to effect the search without notice, i.e., on a 
"no-knock" basis. The warrant was issued based on 
information in the officer's supporting affidavit that a 
confidential informant had been contacted by Swickey, who 
told the informant that he, Swickey, had picked up a quantity 
of methamphetamine and marijuana that was being stored at his 
home in Leeds. The affidavit in support of the warrant 
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contained preprinted language which stated that the affiant 
reasonably believed that the property sought could be easily 
destroyed or hidden or that harm to officers could result 
from notice. Following this language are two boxes that the 
affiant can check, and which were checked, to request 
nighttime and "no-knock" authority. No other factual 
information supports these requests. 
The warrant was executed on a "no-knock" basis on 
October 7, 1988, at approximately 11:30 p.m. When police 
entered Swickeyfs apartment, they found eight people, in 
addition to Swickey, in the home. Everyone except defendant-
respondent was in the living room playing cards around a 
table. Defendant-respondent was in the kitchen. After 
securing the home, the officers had defendant-respondent join 
the other people in the living room, while Swickey was taken 
into the kitchen and placed under arrest, pursuant to an 
arrest warrant, and advised of the search warrant. Another 
individual was arrested when the officers saw drugs nearby, 
in plain view. The remaining individuals, including 
defendant-respondent, were told they could leave the 
premises. Defendant-respondent did not have her shoes, and 
asked if she could go to the bedroom to retrieve them. An 
officer accompanied her to the room, where she took the shoes 
from a pile of items. The officer asked her if she had 
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everything that was hers from that room. Defendant-
respondent replied that she did. 
After defendant-respondent left, the officers conducted 
a search of the home. Narcotics were found throughout the 
house. A purse was seized from the pile in the bedroom from 
which defendant-respondent had retrieved her shoes. Inside 
the purse was a small brown vial which contained 
methamphetamine. Also in the purse were several documents 
that revealed that the purse belonged to defendant-
respondent. 
Police contacted defendant-respondent the next day and 
advised her that they had a purse that belonged to her. She 
came down to the station and was arrested. After being 
advised of her Miranda rights, defendant-respondent admitted 
that the purse and vial of drugs were hers. She told police 
that she had been ""ripping off" drugs from Swickey. 
Prior to trial, defendant-respondent filed a motion to 
suppress the vial and other contents seized from her purse. 
The motion was accompanied by a memorandum of points and 
authorities. The state filed a memorandum opposing 
defendant's motion to suppress, and requested a ruling on 
defendant's motion. On March 17, 1989, the court issued a 
written order denying defendant's motion. 
Defendant-respondent waived her right to a jury trial, 
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and a bench trial commenced on March 21, 1989. During the 
trial, defendant-respondent again renewed her motion to 
suppress. The basis of her argument was that the search 
warrant was defective since the supporting affidavit did not 
support the nighttime or "no-knock" authorization. The state 
argued that "Mr. Swickey would be the only one to have 
standing to object to that," and also argued the merits of 
the claim. The court denied the renewed motion. Defendant-
respondent was convicted as charged. 
Defendant-respondent raised three issues on appeal, all 
of which challenge the district court's failure to suppress 
the items seized from defendant's purse: (1) Whether there 
was sufficient factual information in the supporting 
affidavit to authorize a nighttime search, (2) whether there 
was sufficient factual information in the supporting 
affidavit to authorize a "no-knock" search, and (3) whether 
the search was defective since the warrant was dated 
subsequent to the search. Case factual statement taken from 
Court of Appeals decision. State v. Rowef 80 6 P.2d 730 
(Ut.App. 1991). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court denied the motion to suppress without hearing. 
The defendant-respondent filed a motion with the court and 
was awaiting response from the state prior to the time of 
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trial. The defendant-respondent received plaintiff's 
response to the motion as well as the Judge's decision 
denying the motion within the same week of the trial date. 
Transcript page 8, lines 6-11. 
The court did not allow the defendant-respondent a 
factual hearing nor did the court make any factual findings 
on the record in the denial of said motion. See Rule 12, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 12(c). In essence, 
the trial court denied defendant-respondent the opportunity 
to respond to the issue of standing and to evidence at 
hearing her rights to be in the home. Based thereon, the 
defendant-respondent asserts: 
(1) A guest in a home has standing to object to an 
illegal search of her personal property found within the 
home. This issue is resolved by a finding that the 
defendant-respondent had a legitimate and recognized right or 
expectation of privacy in her own personal property. She did 
not forfeit these rights at the door's front. 
(2) Abandonment did not exist. By leaving her purse 
behind under the stress of the situation, the respondent did 
not manifest the necessary intent to abandon her purse in the 
home. The warrant may not give the police blanket authority 
to search the property of others found within a home. Either 
forgetting the purse or a disclaimer of the person was forced 
by the unlawful search and the attendant search of each 
guest. Neither arises to the level of "abandonment". 
(3) Suppression is the only remedy available. If not 
recognized, the statute imposing additional protections or 
precautions for nighttime searches, is essentially avoided 
and circumvented. It would be idealistic to believe police 
and magistrates cautiously watch over the civil rights of our 
citizens. Unavoidable is the fact situation present here. A 
magistrate rubber stamps conclusions of police officers who 
simply check off boxes on a pre-set form. The protection 
granted by constitutional mandate requires greater sanctions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RESPONDENT HAS STANDING TO ATTACK THE VALIDITY 
OF THE WARRANT BECAUSE HER PERSONAL RIGHTS UNDER 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT*WERE VIOLATED. 
The lower court allowed the State to raise the standing 
issue. The respondent asserts the necessary standing to 
challenge the legality of the search existed. If this Court 
does not so agree, the defendant-respondent should be given 
an opportunity to be heard on that issue at an evidentiary 
hearing. The United States Supreme Court has abandoned an 
automatic standing rule based on being present or being 
charged with a crime involving possession in favor of one 
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that is based on an individual violation of a 
constitutionally protected interest. See United States v. 
Salvucci. 448 U.S. 83 (1980). 
The proponent of a motion to suppress must show that 
their own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the 
challenged search or seizure. Rakas v. Illinois. 439 U.S. 
130, 131 N. 1 (1978) . The standard is the same under the 
United State Constitution and under the Utah Constitution 
Article I, Section 12. See State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 
1256, 126-27 (Utah 1987); State V. IaCQHQ, 725 P.2d 1375, 
1377-78 (Utah 1986); State v. Grueber, 776 P.2d 70, 73 (Ut. 
App. 1989); State V, DeAlQ, 748 P.2d 194, 196 (Ut. App. 
1987). 
Under the standard articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court and adopted by the Utah Supreme Court the 
defendant-respondent has standing^to challenge the search. A 
violation of her personal rights occurred when the officers 
searched her personal property, a purse. A purse of which 
she was essentially forced to leave at the residence, 
otherwise, she was to submit to a further search of herself 
and the purse. A purse is property protected under the 
constitution. U.S. Const. Amend. IV. 
Since the decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), it has been the law 
11 
that "capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment depends . . . upon whether the person who claims 
the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation 
of privacy in the invaded place." Rakas v. Illinois/ 439 
U.S. 128, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 430, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). A 
subjective expectation of privacy is legitimate if it is 
["]one that society is prepared to recognize as 
'reasonable,['"] id. at 143-144 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. at 430 n. 12, 
quoting Katz, suprar at 361, 88 S.Ct. at 516 (Harlan, J., 
concurring). Minnesota v. Olson, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 1687, 109 
L.Ed.2d 85 (1990). The state's position that defendant-
respondent failed to establish standing based on the nature 
of her presence in Swickeyfs home is not compelling• 
In Olson, the Supreme Court concluded "that Olson's 
status as an overnight guest is alone enough to show that he 
had an expectation of privacy in the home that society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable." Xd. 110 S.Ct. at 1688. 
In this case, the evidence did not establish that defendant-
respondent was an overnight guest in Swickeyfs home on the 
night of the search. There is, however, uncontroverted 
evidence that defendant-respondent had an intimate 
relationship with Swickey, which continued to the time of the 
incident. She had stayed overnight in the home on several 
prior occasions. She had placed her personal items as her 
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purse in the bedroom. At the time of the search, she was in 
the kitchen preparing (heating) drinks for all the guests. 
Olson squarely holds that an overnight guest has such 
standing. Olson suggests that a social visit of a duration 
less than overnight would not deprive a guest of standing. 
In this case, defendant-respondent felt secure enough in 
the home to remove her shoes, leave her purse beyond her 
view, and roam to rooms other than where her fellow guests 
were playing cards. Eschewing an analysis based on free 
access and right to exclude others, the Olson Court focused 
on the social tradition that 
hosts will more likely than not respect the privacy 
interests of their guests, who are entitled to a 
legitimate expectation of privacy despite the fact 
that they have no legal interest in the premises 
and do not have the legal authority to determine 
who may or may not enter the household. 
Id. at 1698. 
A standing challenge in the search and seizure context 
is resolved by a determination of "whether governmental 
officials violated any legitimate expectation of privacy." 
Rawlinqs v. Kentucky/ 448 u.s. 98 106, 100 s.ct. 2556, 2562, 
65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980). The defendant's status as an invited 
guest in the home vested her with a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the home. She would expect that her personal 
rights of privacy would be honored and respected. She 
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expected reasonably that she and her property would not be 
abused or violated. She thereby gained sufficient standing 
to challenge the validity of the search warrant and the 
resulting search of her purse. 
She was at the place searched, and it was her property 
that was searched. Most importantly, it was her personal 
rights that were violated when the police searched through 
her purse. 
A similar case is cited by the state, Rawlings v. 
Kentucky. 448 U.S. 97 (1980). In Rawlings the court did not 
find a personal violation sufficient to allow standing to the 
defendant not because it was a purse searched but because it 
was not his purse searched and he had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy that society was willing to recognize 
in the purse. Again, Mr. Swickey here may not have standing 
to object to the search of another's property, but Ms. Rowe 
does. 
In Rawlings the police entered a home with an arrest 
warrant for the occupant. Inside the home they smelled 
marijuana smoke and found several people present. An officer 
left the home to obtain a search warrant while the remaining 
officers detained the occupants. The police were willing to 
let anyone leave if they would consent to a body search. 
When the officer returned with a search warrant, he directed 
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one of the occupants, a Ms. Vanessa Cox, to empty her purse 
on the coffee table. The contents partly consisted of 
narcotics. After dumping out her purse, she turned to the 
man next to her, Mr. Rawlings, and told him to take what was 
his. He took the drugs and at his trial motioned to suppress 
the evidence as the product of an illegal search. The U.S. 
Supreme Court rejected this claim because he did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in Ms. Cox's purse, id. at 
104. 
In the case at bar, it is the owner of the purse who is 
claiming a violation of her constitutionally protected 
rights, not the home owner. She clearly has standing to 
contest the legality of the search of her own personal 
property. 
The respondent has the requisite standing to challenge 
the validity of the search. 
EflINT II 
THE RESPONDENT DID NOT INTEND TO ABANDON HER PURSE 
WHEN SHE LEFT THE HOME DURING THE POLICE SEARCH. 
The state claims the respondent abandoned any reasonable 
expectation of privacy she may have had in her purse by 
leaving it in a place she knew would be searched. The 
standard of abandonment for property law is different in some 
respects from the standard for Fourth Amendment standing. 
However, the two standards are the same in one important 
1 5 
respect, both require an intent to abandon. "The [court] 
must focus on the intent of the person who is alleged to have 
abandoned the place or object. The test is an objective one, 
and intent may be inferred from fwords-spoken, acts done, and 
other objective facts.'". United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 
843, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1989) . 
Objectively looking at the circumstances under which the 
respondent left her purse in the house, the State cannot and 
does not show an intent to abandon. It is the state's 
burden. People v. Conreras. infra. The officers had burst 
into the house without knocking, and after sweeping the home 
for people, rounded everyone up in the living room. The 
defendant was escorted into the bedroom by a police officer 
to get her shoes so she could go home. She retrieved her 
things from a pile of clothing on the floor and thinking she 
had all that was hers left the home. The defendant did not 
intend to give up ownership of her purse and its contents to 
Mr. Swickey. It is more likely that under the stress of the 
situation and her haste to leave the stressful situation of a 
police search of a home, she merely forgot her purse. 
However, "abandonment must be distinguished from a mere 
disclaimer of a property interest made to the police prior to 
the search, which under the better view does not defeat 
standing." United States v. Morales, 737 F.2d 761, 763-64 
16 
(8th Cir. 1984) (quoting 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§11.3, at 548-49 (1978)). 
Whether defendant-respondent had abandoned her purse, 
under search and seizure analysis, is primarily a factual 
question of intent to voluntarily relinquish a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, which may be inferred from "words 
spoken, acts done, and other objective facts." Thomasf 864 
F.2d at 846 (quoting United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 
176 (5th cir. 1973)). See also Gurgel v. Nichol, 19 Utah 2d 
200, 429 P.2d 47, 48 (1967) (abandonment ordinarily a 
question for the factfinder to be determined from the facts 
and circumstances). The burden of proving abandonment falls 
on the state, People v. Contreras, 210 Cal.App.3d 450, 259 
Cal.Rptr. 290, 293 (1989), and must be shown by "clear, 
unequivocal and decisive evidence." Friedman v. United 
States, 347 F.2d 697, 704, (8th Cir. 1675). See alSQ United 
States v. Boswell 347 A.2d 270 274 (D.C. 1975); Q'Shauqhnessy 
v. State, 420 So.2d 377, 379 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1982). It "is 
measured from the vantage point" of the defendant, and not 
the police. Narain v. State, 79 Md.App. 385, 556 A.2d 1158, 
1161 n. 4 (1989). "It is only the [defendant's] state of 
mind that counts." It is from the available facts that the 
issue is resolved. Much as when the state's case must 
evidence a "specific intent" crime. 
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Defendant Rowe was allowed to leave the party along with 
Swickey's other guests; however, subject to the search. She 
was conducted to the bedroom to retrieve her shoes and was 
given the opportunity to claim any other property belonging 
to her. When asked by the police officer if anything else 
belonged to her, she stated that she had retrieved everything 
in the bedroom that was hers. That repudiation of interest 
in property located the bedroom is consistent with a 
conclusion of abandonment. It is not, however, inconsistent 
with a conclusion of mere disclaimer of interest to avoid 
self-incrimination. The state failed to produce evidence 
which would develop this issue and perhaps meet its burden of 
proving abandonment under search and seizure analysis. 
Accordingly, abandonment in the Fourth Amendment sense was 
not established by the state. 
POINT III 
GOOD FAITH AND AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY 
(DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT RELIES ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY 
UPON THE RULINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION. 
BASED THEREON, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT ADOPTS ALMOST ENTIRELY 
THE RULINGS THEREIN.) 
The state further claims the search can be 
validated by the officer's good faith reliance on 
the deficient warrant. United States v. Leon . 468 
U.S. 897, 920-23, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3419-20, 82 
L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). In Leon, the Supreme Court 
held that the exclusionary rule, aimed at deterring 
unlawful police conduct, does not bar evidence 
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obtained by officers acting in good faith reliance 
on a defective warrant. id. But the Leon doctrine 
. is not without limitations. When the magistrate 
reviewing the affidavit in support of the search 
warrant is not presented with sufficient facts to 
determine probable cause, the warrant cannot be 
relied upon by searching officers. Id* 468 U.S. at 
915, 104 S.Ct. at 3417. The Court determined that 
there was nothing in the affidavit in this case 
that would offer any basis to the magistrate for a 
finding of probable cause to allow a nighttime 
search. It appears from the record that the 
endorsement of the nighttime authorization was done 
in impermissible "rubber stamp" fashion. See 
Aauilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 
1512, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964). 
Any officer, cognizant of his responsibility to uphold 
constitutional guarantees, should easily recognize the 
impermissibility of rubber stamp warrants. 
The question of the officer's good faith 
reliance is subject to de novo determination by 
this court. United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 
1451, 1454 (9th Cir. 1986). The conduct of the 
officers executing the search warrant must be 
objectively reasonable. Leop, 468 U.S. at 919, 104 
S.Ct. at 3419. 
Police officers cannot ignore an unambiguous 
statutory directive to present the magistrate with 
"reasonable cause to believe a search is necessary 
in the night," Utah Code Ann. §77-23-5(1) (1990), 
and then claim that their very failure to do so is 
objectively reasonable conduct on their part. See 
Leonr 468 U.S. at 919 n. 20, 104 S.Ct. at 3419 n. 
20 (objective standard requires reasonable 
knowledge of the law by police officers); United 
States V, Freitas, 610 F.Supp. 1560, 1572 (N.D.Cal. 
1985) (police agency must train officers, who have 
obligation to ensure that warrant comports with 
constitutional law), aff'df 800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 
1986) . 
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In this case, the same officer prepared the affidavit, 
secured the warrant, and executed the search. He had 
personal knowledge of the affidavit's contents. They were so 
cavalier in its preparation that the magistrate was dated -
subsequent to the search. A Leon exception should not be 
utilized to circumvent constitutional protections or to cover 
"sloppy" police work. 
Having so concluded, we must now turn our 
attention to whether the warrant's issuance in 
violation of the nighttime search requirements 
necessitates suppression of the evidence seized, 
namely the drugs and other items found in the 
defendant's purse. We recognize that mere 
ministerial and technical errors in the preparation 
or execution of search warrants will not, without 
more, invalidate the warrant. See, e.g., State v. 
Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 702-03 (Utah, 1988) (violation 
of "knock-and-announce" rule did not require 
suppression when no one was at home at the time of 
the search to respond to the knock). Cf. State v. 
Kirn, 70 Haw. 206, 767 P.2d 1238, 1239-40 (1989) 
(suppression may be appropriate for violation of 
constitution, statute, or administrative 
regulation). 
However, where a statute establishes 
procedures for protection of substantive rights, 
such as section 77-23-5 does, violation of the 
statute cannot be dismissed as technical or 
ministerial in nature and suppression of the 
evidence gained from the challenged search is the 
appropriate remedy. Awaya v. Statef 5 Haw.App. 
547, 705 P.2d 54, 59 (seizure of evidence not 
particularly described in the warrant required 
suppression), c&sL. denied. 7 Haw. 685, 744 P.2d 
781 (1985); Wiqqin V. State 755 P.2d 115, 117 
(Okla.Crim.App. 1988) (violation of statute similar 
to section 77-23-5 mandates suppression)/ State v. 
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roylQ. 95 Wash.2d 1, 621 P.2d 1256, 1263 (1980) 
(suppression required for violation of notice 
requirement). But, see State v. Brock 2 94 Or. 15, 
653 P.2d 543, 545-46 (1982) (warrant allowing 
nighttime search without any showing of reasonable 
necessity not invalid and suppression not required, 
when legislature had considered and declined to 
enact specific exclusionary rule for such 
circumstances). 
The historical character of a nighttime search 
further persuades us that violation of the statute 
requires suppression. Ssg, Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 149, 45 S.Ct. 280, 283-84, 69 
L.Ed. 543 (1925) (question of reasonableness of a 
search must be viewed not only from the particular 
facts, but also with an eye toward what was 
considered reasonable at the time of the adoption 
of the Fourth Amendment). Searches of homes were 
soundly condemned by the drafters of the Bill of 
Rights and under English common law. £££ United 
States ex rel. Bovance v. Mvers. 398 F.2d 896, 897-
98 (3rd Cir. 1968). "Night-time search was the 
evil in its most obnoxious form." Monroe v. Pape, 
365 U.S. 167, 210, 81 S.Ct. 473, 496, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 
(1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The 
propriety of executing a search of an occupied 
dwelling at night is "sensitively related to the 
reasonableness" prong of the Fourth Amendment. 
United States v. Gibbons, 607 F.2d 1320, 1326 (10th 
Cir. 1979). See also State v. Lindner, 100 Idaho 
37, 592 P.2d 852, 857 (1979) ("entry into an 
occupied dwelling in the middle of the night is 
clearly a greater invasion of privacy than entry 
executing during the daytime"). 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent's personal reasonable expectations of 
privacy were violated. They searched her purse and thus gave 
her standing to contest the validity of the search. 
To abandon property you must have the intent to do so. 
21 
The facts surrounding the defendant's leaving her purse do 
not support a finding of an intent to abandon her property. 
The court should find the search was unlawful and the 
evidence found pursuant to said search inadmissible at trial 
It should be suppressed. 
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